Sympathy in Nietzsche’s sense cannot be conflated with pity, since it is related to the “shared joy” that he identifies as the crown of friendship. A final section argues that if true friendship is to be nourished rather than destroyed by opposition, the virtue of “sympathy” must be present. Fourth, I show that Nietzsche differs most from ancient authors in his uncompromising insistence that if friendship is to serve truth rather than comfort or illusion, it is necessarily agonistic. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsches Beyond Good and Evil is a critical response to metaphysical writings that try to define good and evil. Third, I will show that Nietzsche takes friendship in its highest form to aim at a goal, appropriately named “truth.” Here I draw upon both “middle period” texts and BGE, the latter to show that a concern for friendship pervades Nietzsche’s oeuvre. Second, I will argue that Nietzsche takes superior friendship to be possible but rare, since it requires its participants to balance three pairs of opposing qualities which are difficult to keep in equilibrium. Insight on this point is valuable, because it provides clear vision of what friendship is not. In this analysis of his thought on friendship, I begin by arguing that for Nietzsche friendship is undesirable or impossible with or between four human types.
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